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   A Note on the Possibility of Self-Reference in Mathematics 
Arieh Lev 
Abstract. In this paper we propose an interpretation for self-referential sentences and 
propositions in a ‘meta- model’ *N of ZF. This meta model *N  is considered as an 
‘informal’ model of arithmetic that mathematicians often use when working with 
number theory. Specifically, we assume that within this meta-model, the axiom 
system ZF is applied, interpretations for sentences can be offered, and natural 
language can be used. We show that under the proposed interpretation, some types of 
self-referential sentences that are considered legitimate in mathematics turn *N  into 
an inconsistent model, and examine the connection of this result to a certain 
interpretation of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem.  Some general problems which 
follow from the above discussion are then addressed. 
1) Introduction 
In this paper we examine the significance of sentences that refer to themselves, in an 
axiomatized theory T  that includes the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system for set theory 
(ZF). We also address propositions that constitute an interpretation of these sentences.  
Specifically, we address propositions which refer to their truth value or their 
provability, like the following two sentences: 
H : The proposition H  is a true proposition.  
G : The proposition G  is unprovable. 
In this paper, we denote the ‘standard’ model for arithmetic by N . We also denote 
the ‘meta-model’ of arithmetic, that mathematicians generally use when working with 
number theory, by *N .  Specifically, we assume that within this meta-model, the 
axiom system ZF is considered, interpretations for sentences can be offered, and 
natural language can be used (for instance, we can use concepts like ‘proof,’ say that a 
proposition is true or untrue, provable or unprovable, etc.).  
Note that the ZF axiom system meets the requirements of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems. We also assume that T  is a consistent theory (that it does not imply a proof 
of both a sentence and its negation).  
Our motivation for concerning ourselves with the proposition G  above is derived, 
naturally, from Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. In proving this theorem, Gödel 
presented a sentence TG , where neither the sentence nor its negation are provable in 
the theory T .  
On the interpretation of the sentence TG , Gödel writes: ‘We therefore have before us 
a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable’ (see, for instance, [H, p. 
 2 
 
598]). In other words, we could say that Gödel showed how we could, within the 
theory T , build sentences that can be interpreted as propositions that speak on their 
own provability. In light of this, it is common today to say that certain propositions 
that refer to themselves are possible in mathematics.   
It is possible in the meta-model *N  to speak about self-reference. We can therefore 
speak within it of propositions like the aforementioned G , and consider implications 
of the ‘meta-interpretation’ of TG  in 
*N . 
We will focus on the significance of the concept of self-reference in the meta-model 
*N . We will begin (in Sections 2 and 3 below) by clarifying the meaning of the 
concepts self-reference and circularity as they are used in this paper. Then we argue 
(in Sections 4 and 5) that in the meta-model *N , propositions that refer to themselves 
(in the sense applied to this in our paper, and assuming the existence of ‘natural 
coding’ in their semantics, as described in Section 4), leads to a ‘conflict’ with the 
ZF’s axiom of foundation. This latter point is of great interest to the study of 
paradoxes and circularity, even without the relation to Gödel’s theorem. On the other 
hand, our discussion can also be related, at least to some extent, to Gödel’s first 
incompleteness theorem. Though it does not detract from the importance of Gödel’s 
first incompleteness theorem, accepting the point of view presented in this paper may 
impact the conclusions that arise from this theorem on the meta-model *N . This latter 
issue will be discussed in Sections 6-8.  
The paper is designed to be accessible to a wider audience of readers, including those 
that are not familiar with topics like self-reference, Gödel’s theorem, or the ZF  
axiom system. For more detailed information, the reader may consult [S], [F] and [V]. 
2) Strong self-reference 
Let us open this section with a clarification of the concept of self-reference, and begin 
with an example. 
Examine the proposition S , which says, ‘I am a proposition that includes fewer than 
15 words.’ This is a proposition that, allegedly, refers to itself. Once we count the 
words in that proposition, we will immediately be convinced of its validity. Though 
the proposition may be thought to contain self-reference, a closer inspection may 
convince us that it does not: the proposition does not speak about itself, but about the 
text that describes it. More specifically, the truth value of this proposition could 
change based on the manner or the language in which it is phrased.  
In contrast, propositions like ‘I am a false proposition’ or ‘It is impossible to prove 
me’ can be said to be self-referential, since they refer to the proposition’s semantics. 
In particular, the meaning of the propositions will not change with changes to the 
phrasing or language in which they are written.   
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We must therefore be careful to address propositions that refer to an ‘extensional 
property’ (see e.g., [R, p. 186] or [J, p. 79]): a property that does not refer to the 
structure or manner of the proposition’s description, but rather to its semantics. We 
will not go into an in-depth discussion of the problem of rigorously defining the 
‘extensional properties’ of propositions here. We shall merely determine that the truth 
value of a proposition, or its provability, are extensional properties, and that 
propositions that address their own truth value or provability are therefore to be 
considered self-referential.  
In order to simplify matters, we add another condition to the concept of self-reference 
in this paper: a condition that demands that the only claim made by a proposition will 
be about its own extensional property. Such a proposition will be said to be strongly 
self-referential. Thus, for instance, the sentence, ‘I am a false proposition’ fulfils that 
condition, while the sentence, ‘2+2=4 is true and I am a true proposition’ does not. 
Note: It may be argued that a proposition which refers to its provability, like ‘ G : The 
proposition G  is unprovable’ does not refer to itself, since a proof of a proposition 
refers only to a syntactic object that represents the proposition, and not to the 
‘content’ or ‘meaning’ of the proposition. However, we shall argue in Chapter 5 that 
we may consider another interpretation of  G  in *N , under which G may be viewed 
as  a strongly self-referential proposition. See Chapter 5 for further details. 
From this point onward, whenever we argue that a proposition is self-referential, we 
will be referring to strong self-reference. We shall say that a sentence (in the theory 
T ) is self-referential if its meta-interpretation in *N  is a self-referential proposition. 
We will be applying similar limitations to our discussion of propositions that refer to 
the extensional properties of other propositions: we will assume that the only claim 
made by that proposition is a claim regarding that extensional property.  
3) Vicious circle 
Russel’s paradox is based on the possibility that a set is a member of itself. In this 
case, Russel proves that it is possible to define a set that is both a member and not a 
member of itself, thereby producing a paradox. For the purposes of discussing such a 
circular situation, Russel defined the principle of the vicious circle. Russel phrased 
this principle in rather vague terms (see e.g., [Chi, p. 3]), stating that: ‘Whatever 
involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection.’  
Mathematicians could not accept a situation in which set theory contains a ‘vicious 
circle’ paradox. They therefore looked for a way to address the problem. Russel 
himself drew up his theory of types (which is not currently popular in mathematics) 
specifically for this purpose, and many other attempts at a solution have been made. 
Today, the accepted approach is Zermelo-Fraenkel’s axiomatic set theory (ZF, or ZFC 
if the choice axiom is included). It has no proof, but mathematicians believe that this 
axiom system prevents the existence of paradoxes in set theory.  
 4 
 
Of particular relevance to our topic is the axiom of foundation (also known as the 
axiom of regularity). We will use the following phrasing of the axiom, which is 
equivalent to the common phrasing for infinite sets (see, e.g., [V, chapter 8, p. 93]): 
Axiom: There is no ordinary infinite -decreasing sequence (that is, there is no 
infinite sequence of the form  123 AAA  ). 
Note that the axiom prevents the possibility that a set will be a member of itself. 
Indeed, if AA  is true, this would necessarily lead to the infinite sequence  
AAA  . Moreover, it also prevents situations in which a set B  is a member of 
a set A  when the set A  is a member of B , etc.  
To avoid vague phrasing (like that employed in Russel’s definition of the vicious 
circle), we clarify that whenever we claim that a set is contaminated by a vicious 
circle situation, we mean that assuming the existence of this set results in a conclusion 
that contradicts the axiom of foundation.   
We also apply the principle of the vicious circle to propositions. We say that the 
principle of the vicious circle applies to a proposition if (the meta-interpretation of) S  
can produce a conclusion that contradicts the axiom of foundation.  
4)  Self-referential propositions 
The discussion in this section takes place within the meta-model of number theory, 
which we have designated above as *N . Recall that in this meta-model we assume the 
ZF axiomatic set theory. Our goal in this section is to show that, based on certain 
(natural) assumptions, the existence of self-referential propositions in *N  stands in 
contradiction to the axiom of foundation.  
For the sake of simplicity, we only address propositions the content of which is 
wholly devoted to claims about the provability (or non-provability) of given 
propositions, such as the following proposition H , which addresses the provability of 
proposition K : 
H : The proposition K   is unprovable. 
Let us examine the following definition: 
Definition: A set A  of propositions will be called a set of type P , if every proposition 
in A  is a proposition wholly devoted to a statement about the provability (or non-
provability) of a proposition belonging to A . 
Even though the definition of the set of type P  may seem ‘strange’ or ‘circular,’ there 
do exist sets of type P  that are not empty. Thus, for instance, if  A L  when L  is the 
proposition ‘the proposition L  is not provable,’ then A  is a non-empty set of type P .  
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We now fix a set 
pA , which is a non-empty set of type P . 
Note that we may interpret a proposition of the form ‘ H : The proposition K   is 
provable/unprovable’ in 
pA  as a function Hf , where K  is the only member of its 
domain, and its value is 1 if H  claims that K   is provable, and 0 if H  claims that K  is 
unprovable. But K  itself is a member of 
pA , and hence may be also interpreted as a 
function 
Kf . Therefore, we conclude that H   may be interpreted as a function (with 
domain  Kf ):    : 0,1H Kf f  .  
Now we define the set 
pF  of functions as follows. For every proposition ‘ L : The 
proposition M  is provable’ (or, alternatively, ‘ L : the proposition M  is unprovable’) 
in the set 
pA , there is a unique function denoted Lf , which is defined as follows: 
:{ } {0,1}L Mf f   where ( ) 1L Mf f   if L  claims that M  is provable and ( ) 0L Mf f   
otherwise. This means that for every function 
L pf F , there is a single element within 
its domain 
Mf , which is itself a function belonging to pF , so that the value ( )L Mf f  is 
determined by the proposition L : the value is 1 if L  claims that M is provable, and 0 if 
L  claims that M  is unprovable.  
The natural map from 
PA  to pF , which transfers every proposition L  to the function 
Lf , is one to one and onto. Since the set PA  is not empty, the set pF  is not empty 
either.  
Now let us assume the existence of the following self-referential proposition in the set 
pA : 
H : H  is not provable. 
This leads us to conclude that for the function    : 0,1H Hf f  , we have ( ) 0H Hf f  , and 
specifically, we have that 
Hf  is a member of its own domain. 
Let us recall that every function : {0,1}f A  can be presented as a set of ordered pairs 
 ba,  (known as the graph of the function, see [V p. 16]), where  ba,  is a member of 
the graph of f  if and only if Aa  and  0,1b  is the only member for which 
baf )( . We can therefore, as is often done, represent (or ‘encode’) the function by 
means of its graph. Representing the function 
Hf  as a set would produce  
  ,0H Hf f . 
Recall that in ZF , the concept of an ordered pair can be defined by 
     baaba ,,,  , so that the ordered pair is a set, and    dcba ,,   if and only if  
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ca   and db   (see [V, p. 15]). Then, the ordered pair  ,0Hf  can be represented 
thus: 
      ,0 , ,0H H Hf f f  
which would lead to: 
        ,0 , ,0H H H Hf f f f  . 
Let us denote:     , ,0H HA f f ,  HB f , and observe that  Hf A . Then we have  
H Hf B A f   , 
which would imply the following infinite -decreasing sequence  
H Hf B A f B A      ,  
which stands in contradiction to the axiom of foundation.  
In other words, by accepting H  as a legitimate proposition, we have arrived at a 
result that contradicts the axiom of foundation. Moreover, any proposition that is 
(strongly) self-referential would yield a similar result.  
In conclusion, we have achieved the following result:  
Lemma 1: Accepting a (strong) self-referential proposition as a legitimate sentence 
contradicts ZF’s axiom of foundation (in the meta-model *N ). 
From this we conclude: if we accept ZF’s axiom of foundation and if we wish to 
determine that *N  is consistent, we must disqualify self-referential propositions as 
meaningful propositions (that can be given a value of true or false) in *N . 
Let us add a few remarks regarding the constructions we performed in order to arrive 
at Lemma 1. We consider the following items. 
1. Constructing the sets of type P  
2. Constructing the set 
PF . 
3. Presenting every function from 
PF  as a set. 
First, the construction of type P  sets is natural and intuitive. There is a chance of 
circularity in the definition of these sets, which might lead these sets to be empty. 
However, assuming the existence of self-referential propositions like proposition H , 
which declares its own provability, ensures that there will be non-empty sets like 
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these. More explicitly, accepting proposition H  as legitimate necessarily entails the 
existence of (non-empty) sets of type P . 
Second, the construction of the set 
PF , where the interpretation of a proposition is 
represented by a function, is also natural and analogous to what is common in 
computer programs, for example, where the semantics of the program is represented 
by a (full or partial) function :p N N  ( N  here represents the set of natural 
numbers). We further recall that the assignment of truth value to sentences is 
represented by a function that assigns to each sentence a value from the set  0,1 . 
Recall also that the halting problem (in which the halting of a program is also an 
extensional property) can be presented as follows: ‘does there exist a function 
( , )h p d , such that for every program p and its input d , ( , ) 1h p d   if p  halts at d  
and ( , ) 0h p d   if p  does not halt at d .’ 
Third, presenting any function from 
PF  as a set is a common representation: every 
function is represented by a set of ordered pairs (known as the graph of the function), 
in which each ordered pair is itself a set. Furthermore, this representation is 
commonly used as the basic definition of a function (see [V, p. 16]).   
Finally, when we combine the three stages of construction we find that, based on the 
assumption that the self-referential proposition H  is legitimate, we can define a set 
the existence of which contradicts the axiom of foundation, and the result is Lemma 1. 
One may also claim that the above constructions result in an encoding of some special 
propositions by sets. We can argue that this coding is analogous to Gödel’s coding, in 
which every formula in a first order language was coded as a natural number, or to a 
situation in which a computer program is coded by a natural number. This is an 
interesting analogy, but accepting it is not necessary to prove Lemma 1. It is enough 
to claim that from the existence of the non-empty set 
PA , we can deduce the existence 
of the non-empty set 
PF , and then the conclusion is drawn naturally from the common 
representation of functions as a set of ordered pairs.     
Additional notes: 
Note 1: The result presented in Lemma 1 can be extended in the following manner: 
Lemma 2: In the meta-model *N , every set of type P  is empty.  
The proof for Lemma 2 is achieved similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, so we will 
content ourselves here with an abbreviated description. 
If 
PA  is a set of type P , then: 
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1. From Lemma 1, we deduce that there are no self-referential propositions in 
PA . 
2. Since every proposition in 
PA  refers to the provability/non-provability of a 
different proposition, we must conclude that, assuming that 
PA  is not empty, 
PA  must include a proposition such as: 1H : The proposition 2H  is 
provable/unprovable. Since we must have 
2 PH A , we conclude that 2H  is a 
proposition such as: 
2H : The proposition 3H  is provable/unprovable, where 
3 PH A . 
3. If we continue in this manner, we will arrive at an infinite sequence of 
propositions of the form: 
iH : the proposition 1iH   is provable/unprovable 
(certain propositions may appear in the sequence more than once). Then, using 
explanations similar to those we used to prove Lemma 1, we will have an 
infinite sequence of functions, each contained in the domain of its predecessor. 
This will result in an infinite -decreasing sequence of sets, contradicting the 
axiom of foundation, and the result follows.   
Lemma 2 leads us to the conclusion that, in addition to self-referential propositions, 
the existence of a (finite or infinite) sequence of propositions 
1 2, , , ,nH H H  in which 
every proposition only refers to a given extensional property of a proposition in the 
sequence, also contradicts the axiom of foundation.  
Note 2: It should be emphasized that the above results were obtained in the meta-
model *N . These results may not be valid in other models for which the meta-
interpretation we used is not allowed.  
Note 3: The results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are significant only if we accept the 
axiom of foundation. There are areas in which it is reasonable not to rely on this 
axiom absolutely (for example in the semantics of natural language). On the other 
hand, in areas that require rigorousness, we are likely to rely on the axiom of 
foundation (we write ‘likely’ because there may be situations in mathematics where 
this axiom is not relied upon as in PA (Peano Arithmetic), for example). And yet, the 
axiom of foundation is generally accepted by those who engage in number theory as 
well, even though in many cases it is not needed.  
Note 4: It should be emphasized that the results of this chapter imply that some 
propositions which were not considered paradoxical (like the propositions ‘L: L is not 
provable’ or ‘K: K is true’) actually contradict the axiom of foundation in *N . If we 
wish to understand the semantic roots of this contradiction, we should attempt to 
follow the meaning of such sentences, an attempt which will lead us to a process of 
infinite regress. The discussion in the next chapter may help to clarify this issue. 
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Note 5: In continuation of the previous note, we can add that the fact that there is an 
analogy between the axiom of foundation and the concept of ‘ungroundedness,’ as it 
is commonly used by philosophers, has been noted before (see e.g., [He]). What we 
have done in this section can be seen as a rigorous discussion of that analogy. In other 
words, our discussion can help clarify the difference between rigorous systems that 
assume the axiom of foundation and other systems.   
5) A discussion on the sentence 
TG  
In the previous section, we concluded that the existence of a (strong) self-referential 
proposition in the meta-model *N  turns *N  into an inconsistent model. Before 
moving on to a discussion of this conclusion’s implications, we first devote this 
section to the connection between self-referential propositions, as presented in the 
previous section, and the sentence TG  that was presented by Gödel in the proof of his 
first incompleteness theorem.  
We recall Gödel’s saying on the interpretation of the sentence TG : ‘We therefore have 
before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable.’ On the other 
hand, there are various claims that TG  is not self-referential, but these claims are 
generally considered not correct. A detailed discussion of this issue, which is 
accessible to a wider audience, can be found in [F, p. 44-46 and p. 84 -87]. On page 
45 the author notes, regarding sentences built by the fixpoint construction (like 
TG ): 
‘…the sentences constructed in the proof that every arithmetical property P  has a 
provable fixpoint are self-referential in a stronger sense.’ We will not follow this 
detailed explanation here, but refer the reader to [F] for further details.  
Gödel also talked of the relation of his sentence to the liar paradox that results from 
the sentence which says about itself that it is untrue. Others go even further and say: 
‘the Gödel sentence in effect results from this paradoxical sentence on substituting 
‘provable’ for ’true’.’ (see for example, [BBJ, p. 227]). So one may say that the 
sentence TG  is equivalent to the sentence: 
L : L   is unprovable. 
However, this may lead to confusion, because though TG  is self-referential, there is a 
substantial difference between the sentence 
TG   and the proposition L . 
Let us discuss the conceptual difference between these two, according to the 
discussion in [F, p. 84-87]. On page 85 the author says of ‘non-formal’ sentences like 
L : ‘Such self-reference has been thought to be suspect for various reasons. In 
particular, the charge of leading to an infinite regress when one attempts to understand 
the statement has been leveled against it.’ This means that if we look for the ‘content’ 
or the ‘meaning’ of the proposition, we will find ourselves in a ‘process of infinite 
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regress.’ On the other hand, Gödel’s sentence ‘refers to a syntactic object, a sequence 
of symbols, and there is no infinite regress involved in establishing the reference on 
the phrase. ’ 
According to the above observation, one may ask whether there is any connection 
between the discussion and conclusions of the previous sections and Gödel’s sentence 
TG .  We claim that the answer to this question depends on the interpretation (or meta-
interpretation) one ascribes to 
TG . In order to discuss this issue further, we shall 
consider the sentence 
TG  in more detail, and follow the discussion in Chapter 16 of 
[S]. We begin by recalling some definitions given there. 
1. The diagonalization of a sentence ( )y   is  y y       , where     
here stands in for the numeral for  ’s Gödel number – the diagonalization of 
 y  is thus equivalent to      . 
2. The relation  ,Gdl m n  holds just when m  is the super Gödel number for a 
PA proof of the diagonalization of the wff (well-formed formula) with Gödel 
number n . 
3.   Gdl ,x y  stands for a 1  wff which canonically captures Gdl . 
Now we follow Gödel in constructing the corresponding wff 
 def U(y)= x Gdl ,x y  . 
For convenience, the above wff will be abbreviated by  'U'  when we do not need to 
express that it contains ‘y’ free. 
Finally, we diagonalize U itself, to give 
 G= y y= U U(y)    , which is equivalent to  U U   . 
This is the ‘Gödel sentence’ denoted by TG  in this paper (we will follow the notations 
of [S] in the rest of this section). Unpacking that a bit we find that G is equivalent to  
  x Gdl , Ux     . 
We denote the latter equivalent wff also by G. 
We give now a ‘meta-interpretation’ for G. In that meta-interpretation, we have that G 
‘says’ that there is no PA proof for the diagonalization of U. But the diagonalization 
of U is G itself. So we may conclude that G ‘says about itself that it is unprovable’ (in 
the following, when we write ‘proof,’ we mean to say a ‘PA proof’). If at this point 
we refer only to the ‘syntactic meaning’ of the formula, interpreted as the 
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‘diagonalization of U,’ we observe no ‘infinite regress’ in the meta-interpretation of 
G. 
On the other hand, when we consider meta-interpretation in *N , we can consider the 
‘content’ or ‘meaning’ of a sentence. In particular, when we observe in such a meta-
interpretation that a sentence ‘talks’ about the provability (or unprovability) of 
another sentence, questions like ‘what is the meaning of that sentence’ are legitimate. 
Furthermore, if we found in this meta-interpretation that this sentence also ‘talks’ 
about the provability of a sentence, we can continue questioning in the same manner. 
Hence, using the above meta-interpretation for G, we may write the ‘content’ or 
‘meaning’ of G as follows: 
G: there is no proof to ‘the diagonalization of U. ’ 
However, since the diagonalization of U is G itself, which says that ‘there is no proof 
to the diagonalization of U’, then, if instead of considering the ‘diagonalization of U’ 
only as a syntactic object, we continue to ‘meta-interpret’ the ‘diagonalization of U,’ 
we may write the ‘meaning’ of G as follows: 
G: there is no proof to ‘there is no proof to the diagonalization of U, ’ 
and applying this argument again: 
G: there is no proof to ‘there is no proof to ‘there is no proof to the diagonalization of 
U. ’ 
When we continue to apply the above argument, we conclude that there exists an 
infinite regress in this meta-interpretation of G. 
Note further that the claim ‘there is no proof to the ‘diagonalization of U’ is the only 
claim made by G (according to the above meta-interpretation), and since - again by 
the above meta-interpretation - the ‘diagonalization of U’ is G itself, we have that the 
sentence G is strongly self-referential, according to the denotation in Section 2. 
We shall now summarize our observations. We may ascribe two meta-interpretations 
to the sentence G: a ‘formal interpretation’ and a ‘referential interpretation.’ Firstly, in 
both interpretations we ask: ‘what does G say? ’ and the answer is ‘G says that there 
is no proof to the diagonalization of U.’ Then comes a second question, which is 
different for each interpretation. In the ‘formal interpretation’ we ask: ‘what is ‘the 
diagonalization of U?’ and the answer is: ‘the diagonalization of U is G itself.’ Now, 
since G is just a syntactic object, we have that G ‘says’ that there is no formal proof 
for the sentence G, and the result of the first incompleteness theorem follows. In 
particular, no infinite regress is observed under this interpretation. In the second 
‘referential interpretation,’ we ask again the first question about the diagonalization of 
U: ‘what does the diagonalization of U say? ’ and the answer is ‘the diagonalization 
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of U says that there is no proof to the diagonalization of U,’ and by repeating this 
question further, an infinite regress results.  
It should be emphasized that the existence of the second meta-interpretation has 
nothing to do with the first incompleteness theorem, which remains a valid theorem. 
On the other hand, combining the second interpretation for G with the results of the 
previous section shows that the very existence of the Gödel’s sentence causes a 
contradiction to the axiom of foundation in the model *N . 
 
6) A note regarding the significance of the results 
In the wake of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the opinion took root that sentences 
that can be interpreted as ‘self-referential’ (like TG ) are possible in mathematics. In 
the previous sections, we showed that this need not be always the case. On the one 
hand, in PA (Peano’s axiom system for natural numbers), which does not include the 
axiom of foundation, such sentences are still possible. The same may be said of other 
formal theories which include PA. On the other hand, based on the second meta-
interpretation of such sentences, which was introduced in the previous chapter, we 
deduce that accepting these sentences as legitimate in the meta-model *N  may lead to 
a paradox. It follows that we should consider the possibility of rejecting the existence 
of (strong) self-referential sentences in the meta-model *N  as natural and logical.  
It is possible that further philosophical discussions on what we have said above are in 
place, but it is not our purpose to proceed with such discussions here. We only note 
that since the second interpretation introduced in the previous chapter uses arguments 
which are also used in the proof of the first incompleteness theorem, our opinion is 
that this second interpretation should not be ignored. From now on we limit ourselves 
to the following summary of the results up to this point: 
1. Accepting a (strong) self-referential proposition in the meta-model *N  as 
legitimate turns *N  into an inconsistent model.  
2. Under some meta-interpretation of Gödel’s sentence TG , a contradiction with 
the axiom of foundation occurs in the meta-model *N . 
These two conclusions will be our assumptions in the following two sections, where 
we present methods for addressing the problem that they raise. These methods can 
also be adapted to exclusively address the problem raised by result #1 (if we were to 
reject the interpretation upon which the second result relies). They may also be 
relevant if we reject both results, but are interested in methods for addressing the 
problem of the existence of ‘strange’ self-referential sentences (like TG ( in 
mathematics.   
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7) Approaches for coping with the problem 
There are various possibilities for dealing with the problem of the existence of self-
referential proposition in *N . In what follows we present several suggestions that 
look worthy of discussion. They are:  
1. Accepting the fact that *N  contains ‘paradoxical’ propositions. 
2. Renouncing the axiom of foundation in *N . 
3. Making a change in the first order language or in the theory T  that leads to the 
rejection of self-referential sentences, such as 
TG . 
4. Imposing limits on the interpretation (meta-interpretation) of sentences of T . 
5. Accepting that certain sentences in the language will not have truth values 
(false or true). In other words, renouncing, to some extent, the law of excluded 
middle, and accepting that self-referential sentences will have a third value, 
designated, for example, NM (No Meaning).  
In the following, we confine ourselves to the fifth possibility. The fact that this 
possibility waives the law of excluded middle seems like an extreme step. However, 
in light of the fact that there are well-formed sentences that lead to paradox (at least 
under a certain interpretation), the idea of adopting three truth values (True, False, 
NM) may be acceptable. This bitter pill can be sweetened with the clarification that, 
for all ‘regular’ sentences, the truth value would remain unchanged (i.e., True or 
False, as before). The new value (NM) would be reserved only for very special 
sentences (that are interpreted as self-referential). 
Three-valued logic has been used more than once in addressing problems analogous 
to the problem that concerns us here (see, for instance, [K] for the use of Kleene’s 
strong three-valued logic, or [B] for Bochvar's internal three-valued logic, also known 
as Kleene's weak three valued logic). This proposal appears to return us to the 
situation in natural language wherein propositions can have vague meaning, or lack 
meaning at all – something that we wish to avoid. In practice, however, if we define a 
logic that embraces the idea behind Bochvar's internal three-valued logic, we will find 
that the impact of using three-valued logic is not so revolutionary. Under such a logic, 
the discussion can effectively be reduced to sentences that are not interpreted as self-
referential, for which the law of excluded middle remains very much alive.  
Let us move on to describe the proposal itself. Accepting this proposal requires that 
we replace the law of excluded middle with a different law, which we call ‘the 
extended law of excluded middle’: 
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The extended law of excluded middle: For every sentence A  in a language, one 
(and only one) of the following is true: 
1. The truth value of A  is NM. 
2. A A .  
In this logic, we demand that the truth value of a sentence that contains a component 
with the truth value NM will always be NM. Moreover, let us declare that the domain 
of the quantifiers will include only the values of the variables for which the truth 
value of the relevant sentence is other than NM.  
The resulting state requires that we redefine what constitutes a consistent theory, and 
when a theory is complete. The definitions are as follows: 
Definition: A theory is consistent if for every sentence A  there is no proof for both 
A  and A , and if every sentence with a truth value NM has no proof. 
Definition: A consistent theory is complete if for every sentence A  with a truth value 
that is not NM, there is proof for A  or  A . 
As long as we wish that the meta model *N  will be consistent, the following notes 
should be considered.  
1. In a consistent theory, the truth value of every (strong) self-referential 
sentence must be NM. 
2. Since the (‘normal’) rules of inference are valid only when they or their 
components have a truth value of True or False, we determine that a sentence 
with a truth value of NM has no proof, and it cannot appear as a component of 
any rule of inference in any consistent theory.  
3. Therefore, in a consistent theory, a sentence with a truth value of NM cannot 
appear in any proof.  
4. Moreover, in a consistent theory, a sentence with a truth value of NM cannot 
be used as an axiom (because axioms are automatically associated with the 
truth value True). 
In a language that is informal, we can say, in light of the definitions and the comments 
we have presented, that sentences with a truth value of NM are ‘excluded’ in any 
consistent theory: they cannot be proved and nothing can be inferred from them. 
Therefore, at least in practical terms, we can make the rather vague argument that, 
under the new definitions, all of the mathematical work within the meta-model *N  
‘remains as it was.’ The only difference between the new situation and the previous 
one is a newfound ‘disregarding of self-referential sentences.’    
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8) The implications of the problem 
The problem we have raised carries additional implications, which will be briefly 
discussed in this section.  
Firstly, it raises a question regarding the first incompleteness theorem itself: 
What is the value of the theorem if we have shown, at least apparently, that there is a 
flaw in its proof? As we noted earlier, the answer to this question is simple: there is no 
flaw in the construction of the sentence 
TG  and in the inference that it ‘refers to itself 
and has no proof in T .’ On the other hand, the theorem gives rise to a claim that is no 
less important than its original one: ‘there exists a well-defined sentence in T  that is 
paradoxical, when meta-interpreted in *N .’ 
We therefore find that under a certain interpretation the theorem faces us with a 
problem that is ‘worse’ than incompleteness, namely, inconsistency. As we have 
shown in the previous section, this problem can probably be circumvented by 
introducing changes to the theory or its interpretation. However, it will be necessary 
to check whether such circumvention will be able to prevent the phenomenon of self-
reference in an entirely formal way (without the need address the sentences’ 
meaning). If we adopt the suggestion of extending the law of excluded middle (as we 
did in the previous section), the conclusion of Gödel’s theorem can be presented in 
the following manner (when T  is a theory which contains a ‘sufficient part’ of ZF -
including the axiom of foundation):  
If T  is consistent, then there exists a sentence that has ‘no meaning’ (NM) in T . 
In conclusion, we find that the validity and the importance of Gödel’s theorem remain 
unchanged, so long as we provide the theorem with a suitable interpretation. We 
might even claim that there is an interpretation which carries a ‘more significant 
impact’ – an impact that raises concerns regarding possible changes to the theory 
and/or its interpretation.  
Secondly, the problem returns us once again to the issue of incompleteness. For 
example, if we adopt the definition of completeness from the previous section, we are 
once again faced with the question of whether a theory T  is complete (Gödel’s 
theorem will not help us when the sentence TG  has a truth value of NM, so its 
improvability does not lead to incompleteness under the new definition). However, 
there are proofs for incompleteness theorems that do not rely on self-reference. One 
such is, for instance, Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem (see [Cha], or [F, chapter 8]), 
which relies on principles from Information Theory. Chaitin himself writes in [Cha] 
about the difference between his approach and Gödel’s: 
Gödel's theorem may be demonstrated using arguments having an information-
theoretic flavour. In such an approach it is possible to argue that if a theorem 
contains more information than a given set of axioms, then it is impossible for 
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the theorem to be derived from the axioms. In contrast with the traditional proof 
based on the paradox of the liar, this new viewpoint suggests that the 
incompleteness phenomenon discovered by Gödel is natural and widespread 
rather than pathological and unusual.  
9) Summary and additional notes 
In this paper we proposed an interpretation for self-referential sentences in a ‘meta- 
model’ *N  of ZF. Under this interpretation, we obtained the following two results:  
1. Accepting (strong) self-referential sentences as legitimate turns the meta-model *N  
into an inconsistent model.  
2. Under a certain interpretation of Gödel’s sentence 
TG ,  it is possible to argue that 
accepting this sentence as legitimate turns the meta-model *N  into an inconsistent 
model.  
These two conclusions were followed by a basic discussion (Section 7) which offered 
suggestions for addressing the problems that arise from the conclusions. We 
considered using the ideas of Bochvar's internal three-valued logic, which in general 
terms can be said to ‘exclude self-referential sentences’ and therefore ‘solve the 
problem by "ignoring" it.’ This approach is one of several different possibilities for 
managing the problem of self-reference (see for instance, [D, p. 10]), but it seems best 
suited for use in rigorous mathematical systems.  
If we accept the interpretation introduced in this article, the above results raise 
additional questions and problems that must be addressed, but the discussion of which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. For example: 
1. We must keep searching and inquiring into the possibilities for addressing the 
existence of paradoxical sentences in *N , either in continuation of the options 
presented in Section 7 or in new and original directions. One specific question 
that must be addressed is whether it is possible to define a theory of arithmetic 
that does not allow for the construction of self-referential sentences. 
2. It would be interesting to continue examining the influence of our discussion 
on the various existing proofs of incompleteness, and on the results and 
conclusions that would be produced by relying on those theorems.  
3. Problems of self-reference appear elsewhere in mathematics. Some proofs that 
use fixpoint construction or other diagonal methods can be said to be involved 
with self-reference. It would therefore be interesting to study how the 
discussion in this paper might influence these proofs. Two important problems 
in this area are the halting problem in the Theory of Computability, and the 
use of Cantor’s diagonal method to show that the set of real numbers is not 
countable. It is likely that the issues we have raised here will have an impact 
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on these proofs. These topics are addressed in [L1] and [L2]. The discussion in 
this paper is relevant to self-reference problems in other (primarily 
philosophical) contexts as well, which have not been addressed here (see, for 
instance, [D], [He]).  
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